{"id":68237,"date":"2023-11-21T19:13:12","date_gmt":"2023-11-21T19:13:12","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.essaybishops.com\/dissertations\/max-webers-contribution-philosophical-methodology-of-social-sciences-philosophy-essay\/"},"modified":"2023-11-21T19:13:12","modified_gmt":"2023-11-21T19:13:12","slug":"max-webers-contribution-philosophical-methodology-of-social-sciences-philosophy-essay","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.homeworkacetutors.com\/assessments\/max-webers-contribution-philosophical-methodology-of-social-sciences-philosophy-essay\/","title":{"rendered":"Max Webers Contribution Philosophical Methodology Of Social Sciences Philosophy Essay"},"content":{"rendered":"
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For decades, numerous philosophical studies have attempted to explore modern society characterized by pluralism and conflicts over values. Against this background, no definitive answer has been given to the question of how we can better understand the complexity and diversity of the contemporary world. Under the circumstances, there have been attempts within certain philosophical circles to find a new approach to interpret modern society based on epistemological foundation. The difficulty of understanding the contemporary world mainly stems from our tendency to adopt an explanatory approach driven by a natural scientific model. According to the natural scientific methodology, the world is governed by universal laws which can be discovered empirically. This deductive methodology is likely to consider general trends but ignores the particularity and individuality of specific cases. This obsession with the natural scientific model was criticized by Max Weber in the nineteenth century. Against the naturalistic monism which generalizes all empirical facts into a common law in all empirical facts, Weber argues that \u201cobjectivity\u201d analysis (the reduction of empirical reality of law) is meaningless in the cultural sciences (Weber, 1949, p. 80). In particular, he emphasized the sharp distinction between the natural and cultural sciences and raised the question if the \u2018objectivity\u2019 of the natural sciences could be applied equally to the cultural sciences.<\/p>\n

According to Weber (1949), unlike the natural sciences, which study the phenomena of nature, the social sciences aim to find social phenomena: the relation among humans including their behaviors and subjective intentions. The objects of the natural sciences can studied without the investigator\u2019s value-judgment because they are completely separated from the investigator. In contrast, the objects of the social sciences consist of people with different values. Since the investigator is also a member of society, the involvement of his or her values is unavoidable when researching a certain social phenomena. Simply put, completely \u201cobjective\u201d study can barely be conducted and it is much more difficult in the social sciences. Thus, it is important for social scientists to be aware that their \u201csubjectivity\u201d can have an impact on their analyses. Max Weber\u2019s greatest concern was in what ways investigators cognize the social phenomenon and how they can overcome the matter of \u201cobjectivity\u201d.<\/p>\n

Many remember Max Weber as a sociologist due to his considerable amount of writings about various areas in the social sciences. However, he was also a social philosopher who gave us comprehensive ideas about human nature and the world in which we live. This paper aims to examine Max Weber as a philosopher with regard to his contribution to the philosophical methodology of the social sciences.<\/p>\n

2. WEBER\u2019S INTELLECTUAL BACKGROUND (POSITIVISM VS HISTORIANISM)<\/h2>\n

In his journal, \u2018\u201dObjectivity\u201d in Social Science and Social Policy\u2019, Max Weber develops his unique methodology of the social sciences in relation to the debates between naturalism (positivism) and historicism (German historical school) (Tenbruck, 1959; Ringer, 1997). As Weber acknowledges, there is a sharp contrast between naturalism and historicism with regard to how we acquire knowledge: explanatory and interpretive methodology (Hekman, 1983; Ringer, 1997). Recognizing the strong contrast between these two theories, Weber tried to find an alternative methodology which would overcome their limits(Eksrom, 1992; Hekman, 1983; Ringer, 1997; Tenbruck, 1959). It is worth taking a quick look at these two philosophical theories for a better understanding of Weber\u2019s methodological position in the social sciences.<\/p>\n

Naturalism, which is also called positivism, was the most widespread theory in the philosophies of science in the early nineteenth century. Driven by the intellectual movement of the Enlightenment, central to positivism is the notion that only rational evaluation of empirical evidence can distinguish knowledge from unscientific thoughts such as traditional religions and superstitions (Halfpenny, 2003). In other words, only knowledge confirmed by scientific method can be accepted and this knowledge becomes a universal law to explain a particular phenomena. In addition to natural phenomenon, positivists claim that the casual laws discovered by scientists can also be adopted to the study of society. In the early 1990s, this positivism was reexamined by logical positivists, the Vienna Circle. Like previous positivists, logical positivists believed in empiricism and stressed \u201cthe demarcation of knowledge that was properly scientific\u201d from others which are not logically and empirically justified such as metaphysics (ibid, p. 372). More specifically, logical positivists put an emphasis on deductive methodology following the natural scientific model. The predominance of the deductive method over the inductive one driven by logical positivists produced distorted image of the scientific methodology (Huff, 1984, p. 2). In fact, since the 1960s, logical positivism has been confronted with many criticisms by post-empiricist philosophers and their criticisms are based on Weber\u2019s ideas of the methodology (ibid, p. 8).<\/p>\n

As a rule, Weber took the view of German historicism: he rejected positivists\u2019 ideas of the naturalistic monism (Tenbruck, 1959). Unlike the positivists advocating deductive methodology (in which we acquire knowledge from casual law confirmed by scientific method), German historians espoused inductive methodology, and called attention to individuality and cultural diversity (Ringer, 1997). German historians refused to study a particular fact or phenomenon with a definite concept. For example, Ranke, one of the German historians, made an explicit statement as to weakness of deductive methodology and put on emphasis on \u201cindividualities\u201d. He wrote, \u201cFrom the particular, you may ascend to the general; but from general theory there is no way back to intuitive understanding of the particular.\u201d (quoted in Ringer, 1995, p. 11).<\/p>\n

Weber\u2019s disposition of German historicism can be found most explicitly in his adaptation of Rickert\u2019s view on scientific conceptualization. Rickert argued that empirical reality has no definite features and that the understanding of empirical reality depends on the way we see it. In his book, Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung, Rickert said: \u201cEmpirical reality becomes nature when we view it with respect to the universal; it becomes history when we view it with respect to the particular and the individual\u201d (quoted in Mises, 1958, p.129). In accordance with Rickert, Weber (1949) argued as follows. Here and further on this paper I use bold face type for my own emphasis:<\/p>\n

The transcendental presupposition of every cultural science lies not in our finding a certain culture or any \u201cculture\u201d in general to be valuable but rather in the fact that we are culture beings, endowed with the capacity and the will to take a deliberate attitude towards the world and to lend it significance (ibid, p.81).<\/p>\n

Now, as soon as we attempt to reflect about the way in which life confronts us in immediate concrete situations, it presents an infinite multiplicity of successively and coexistently emerging and disappearing events, both \u201cwithin\u201d and \u201coutside\u201d ourselves. The absolute infinitude of this multiplicity is seen to remain undiminished even when our attention is focused on a single \u201cobject\u201d\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6.All the analysis of infinite reality which the finite human mind can conduct rests on the tactic assumption that only a finite portion of this reality constitutes the object of scientific investigation, and that only it is \u201cimportant\u201d in the sense of being \u201cworthy of being know\u201d (ibid. p.72)<\/p>\n

Simply put, human perception attributes the meaning and significance to the world. Only a limited part of the universe can be the objects of scientific research. In this sense, Weber disagreed with the positivist belief that we can derive universal truth from the conjunction of events. That is because the concrete reality is not identical with the casual explanation discovered by scientific research. According to Weber:<\/p>\n

There is no absolutely \u201cobjective\u201d scientific analysis of culture \u2013 or put perhaps more narrowly but certainly not essentially differently for our purposes- of \u201csocial phenomena\u201d independent of special and \u201cone-sided\u201d viewpoints according to which \u2013 expressly or tacitly, consciously or unconsciously- they are selected, analyzed and organized for expository purposes (ibid, p. 72).<\/p>\n

For Weber \u201cobjectivity\u201d cannot be scientifically justified even in the natural sciences. For that reason, the deductive methodology (reducing the conjunction of events to causal law) advocated by positivists is meaningless. Accordingly, we can say his point of view is in line with German historicism. However, he did not fully accept the historians\u2019 view on finding rules in the society. Although Weber commends historians for their acknowledgements of \u2018particularity\u2019 or \u2018individuality\u2019 of reality, he differed from their traditional views of historicism (Tenbruck, 1959). From the point of view of historians, clear concepts or knowledge of causal laws obstructs our understanding of reality. In opposition to their standpoint, Weber declared these are indispensible analytical tools to conduct scientific research (ibid, p. 75-76). Weber wrote:<\/p>\n

\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6 knowledge of reality with respect to its cultural significance and its causal relationships can be attained through the quest for recurrent sequences\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6the analysis of reality is concerned with the configuration into which those (hypothetical!) \u201cfactors\u201d are arranged to form a cultural phenomenon which is historically significant to us\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6. If we wish to \u201cexplain\u201d this individual configuration \u201ccausally\u201d we must invoke other equally individual configurations on the basis of which we will explain it with the aid of those (hypothetical!) \u201claws.\u201d (ibid, p. 75)<\/p>\n

Consequently, despite his criticism of positivism, Weber recognizes the necessity of finding casual laws because we need these concepts to understand the infinite world. However, unlike positivists, these laws are not the purpose of scientific research but \u2018heuristic\u2019 means of understanding reality. Put it in another way, what he denies is that these laws become a principle of nature as the positivists argue. Due to his acknowledgement of causal laws, Weber faced many criticisms for his position (Huff, 1984). It is beside the point, however, to discuss whether he is an historian or a positivist. What we should focus on is the fact that Weber tried to establish an alternative scientific methodology in the social sciences in relation to disputes between naturalism and anti-naturalism. More specifically, his aim was to explore \u201can empirical science of concrete reality (Wirklichkeitswissenschaft)\u201d.<\/p>\n

3. WEBER\u2019S METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES<\/h2>\n

2-1. EMPIRICAL SCIENCE OF CONCRETE REALITY<\/h2>\n

Weber declared that \u201cthe type of social science in which we are interested is an empirical science of concrete reality\u201d :<\/p>\n

Our aim is the understanding of the characteristic uniqueness of the reality in which we move. We wish to understand on the one hand the relationships and the cultural significance of individual events in their contemporary manifestations and on the other the causes of their being historically so and not otherwise (ibid, p. 72).<\/p>\n

An empirical science of concrete reality is a way of understanding the phenomenon in the world in a cultural context. According to Weber, ideas about universal laws must be based on, and related to, values of particular people and society. In other words, there can be no complete objectivity. Rather, valuation of the world is always qualified by ideas and perceptions of the investigator. Weber wrote:<\/p>\n

The significance of a configuration of cultural phenomena and the basis of this significance cannot however be derived and rendered intelligible by a system of analytical laws, however perfect it may be, since the significance of cultural events presupposes a value-orientation towards these events. The concept of culture is a value-concept (ibid, 76).<\/p>\n

Therefore, the most important criteria to select \u201cworthy of being know\u201d is our value-orientation. In other words, researchers use their \u201cevaluative ideas\u201d to judge what can be studied as the objects of investigation and what significance has to our lives. To be exact, the researcher \u201cweighs and choose from among the values involved according to his own conscience and his personal view of the world\u201d (ibid, p. 53). Weber argues that the cultural or social sciences can only be conducted under researcher\u2019s \u201ccultural values\u201d. Furthermore, the meaningfulness of the research can only be found when the researcher\u2019s value is acknowledged:<\/p>\n

To be sure, without the investigator\u2019s evaluative ideas, there would be no principle of selection of subject-matter and no meaningful knowledge of the concrete reality (ibid).<\/p>\n

In this respect, Weber disagrees with people who believe that the \u201cobjective\u201d and \u201ctrue\u201d reality exist on the facts discovered by scientists. He asserts this point of view as \u201cthe naive self-deception\u201d of researchers whose evaluative ideas are unconsciously involved when selecting \u201ca tiny portion\u201d from \u201can absolute infinity\u201d as a subject-matter for their study (ibid). Consequently, Weber denies the possibility of an \u201cobjective\u201d point of view with regard to conducting investigation. According to Weber, all evaluative ideas are \u201csubjective\u201d. As a result, he rejects the naturalists view that all investigators\u2019 values should be excluded with regard to studying the social sciences. That is because a value-free investigation is impossible in the social sciences due to researchers\u2019 evaluative ideas.<\/p>\n

Against this ostensible \u201cvalue-freedom\u201d, Weber argues that the validity of empirical knowledge is achievable when the investigator explicates his or her subjective \u201cevaluative ideas\u201d (value-relevance). However, we should not identify Weber\u2019s conception of value-relevance with value-judgment. Although the investigator\u2019s values influence on his or her approach to selecting subject-matter, Weber claims that the researcher should be free from value-judgment in his or her analyses (Tenbruck, 1959). More specifically, as mentioned above, the selection of subject-matter and its concept-construction are conducted by researchers\u2019 evaluative ideas. It means that the results of scientific research cannot be universal laws or common cultural values. Accordingly, it is inappropriate to enforce particular ethical standards by using scientific authority. This is the freedom from value-judgment Weber meant. In other words, Weber\u2019s \u201cobjectivity\u201d in the social sciences can be defined in the following way: Historians or social research workers, by acknowledging their value-orientation, can avoid confusion created by a wide range of different values. Then, they seek the logical consistency of what they study in a value-free way. In this sense, Weber\u2019s \u201cobjectivity\u201d in the social sciences is not the objectivity of empirical sciences. Instead, Weber argues for a qualified \u201cobjectivity\u201d, methodology which is aware of its own limits and values, but which makes an effort to be logically consistent.<\/p>\n

2-2. CONSTRUCTION OF IDEAL-TYPES<\/h2>\n

As mentioned before, Weber attempted to overcome the disjunction between naturalism and anti-naturalism by rigorously defining the foundation of epistemology; how do we know the things we know? When it comes to different aspects of the social sciences from the natural sciences (an empirical science of concrete reality), Weber disapproves of the natural science model which seeks to discover universal laws. However, unlike historians, due to limits of interpretive understanding, he argues that we need theoretical concepts as \u2018heuristic means\u2019 for understanding of the \u2018infinite\u2019 reality. In other words, along with historians, Weber\u2019s starting point is with specific cases, the particularities of individual situation. Once this was achieved, taking positivists\u2019 way, he turns his eyes to methodology in order to conceptualize theory (Hekman, 1983). His attempt to construct theory based on value-relevance can be explained through the concept of the \u201cideal-type\u201d. An ideal-type enables investigators to have both approaches advocated by historians and positivists: individualization and generalization.<\/p>\n

His construction of ideal-types comes from his criticism of Menger\u2019s abstract-theoretical approach. Menger understands the disparity between concept and reality, but acknowledges the necessity to build abstract theory(Ringer, 1997). Weber agrees with his basic position, but points out Menger\u2019s error. According to Weber (1949, p. 87), \u201cIn spite of the fundamental methodological distinction between historical knowledge and the knowledge of \u201claws\u201d which the creator of the theory drew as the first and only one, he now claims empirical validity, in the sense of the deductibility of reality from \u201claws,\u201d for the propositions of abstract theory.\u201d That is to say, Menger is aware that knowledge of laws discovered in all social sciences cannot be identical with reality, but argues that we can deduct reality from the knowledge. Weber rejects his view that reality can be deducted from laws and particular phenomenon can be anticipated from these laws. In other words, Weber disagrees with the statement that the purpose of the sciences is to establish laws. These laws are nothing but ideal-types which were arbitrarily formulated based on subjective perspectives. For example, in Weber\u2019s argument, \u201cabstract economic theory\u201d offers an \u201cideal\u201d picture of commodity-market such as \u201cfree competition\u201d and \u201crational conduct\u201d, but the \u201cconstruct\u201d is a \u201cutopia\u201d because it is achieved by conceptual \u201caccentuation\u201d of a particular element of reality (ibid, p. 90). In this case, ideal-types can be used as analytical tools to explain the \u201ccharacteristic features\u201d of this relationship clearly. Weber wrote:<\/p>\n

This conceptual pattern brings together certain relationships and events of historical life into a complex, which is conceived as an internally consistent system. Substantively, this construct in itself is like a utopia which has been arrived at by the analytical accentuation of certain elements of reality. Its relationship to the empirical data consists solely in the fact that where market-conditioned relationships of the type referred to by the abstract construct are discovered or suspected to exist in reality to some extent, we can make the characteristic features of this relationship pragmatically clear and understandable by reference to an ideal-type. This procedure can be indispensable for heuristic as well as expository purposes. The ideal typical concept will help to develop our skill in imputation in research: it is no \u201chypothesis\u201d but it offers guidance to the construction of hypotheses. It is not a description of reality but it aims to give unambiguous means of expression to such a description (ibid).<\/p>\n

Ideal-types are used to demonstrate the general quality of a particular human behavior. According to Weber, a certain ideal-type comes into being when characteristic features of particular facts selected by investigators are put together. Weber calls this \u201cideal-construct\u201d (ibid, p. 91). For example, if we attempt to find a ideal-construct of \u201chandicraft\u201d, the same principle characterizing the ideal-typical \u201chandicraft\u201d appears in any states and any periods(ibid, 90-91). Weber acknowledges that the process of constructing an ideal type looks like a utopia. A utopia here, however, should not be negatively understood. Ideal-types are by no means reproduction of the facts and are not something far away from the facts. Rather, they are concepts to provide guidance for analyzing the causal relationships behind the human behavior. That is to say, ideal-types are not an \u201cend\u201d but cognitive \u201cmeans\u201d to understand the particularity of cultural phenomenon (ibid, 92). Weber see ideal-types as functional tools, not as universal truth. Therefore, he stresses that we must not identify ideal-types with actual \u201creality\u201d.<\/p>\n

As Weber mentioned above, ideal-types cannot be hypotheses, but they can provide guidance to construct hypotheses. And these hypotheses are means to understand social phenomenon. Of course this raises the question of how we verify ideal-types with empirical facts(Winch, 1958). As Weber argued, ideal-types need to be scientifically verified and historical science is also a \u201crational science\u201d(Aron, 1968, p. 192). Thus, verification of ideal-types also require \u201cclarity and verifiable accuracy of insight and comprehension(Evidenz)\u201d by rational understanding such as \u201clogical and mathematical\u201d methodology(Weber, 1947, p. 90). For example, Weber argues that human behaviors can be understood in the same way as \u201c2 X 2 = 4\u201d by \u201ca logical train of reasoning according to our accepted modes of thinking\u201d(ibid). This implies causal laws can be discovered by logical thinking in the social sciences. More specifically, social scientists should be able to interpret and explain why a certain historical event took place (Aron, 1968). Weber shows how we can rationalize our interpretation of certain human behavior or historical events within society through causal analysis. In Weber\u2019s argument, historical causation originates from connecting particular facts with the components of previous ones:<\/p>\n

Our real problem is, however: by which logical operations do we acquire the insight and how can we demonstratively establish that such a casual relationship exists between those \u201cessential\u201d components of the effects and certain components among the infinity of determining factors \u00e2\u20ac\u00a6 Rather, does the attribution of effects to causes take place through a process of thought which includes a series of abstractions. The first and decisive one occurs when we conceive of one or a few of the actual causal components as modified in a certain direction and then ask ourselves whether under the conditions which have been thus changed, the same effect or some other effect \u201cwould be expected\u201d (Weber, 1949, p. 171)<\/p>\n

For example, if we attempt to find the origin of capitalism, we first need to discover the unique features of capitalism. Then we analyze which previous events are related to these features and observe how those causal components are intertwined in a particular direction. From this process, we will be able to find which sources are relevant to the origin of capitalism and conclude that these are the historical causes of capitalism. In other words, we produce \u201cimaginative constructs\u201d in order to gain insight into the causal relations between historical facts (ibid, p. 173). Here, Weber\u2019s causal analysis rests on the \u201cmotivational understanding\u201d of actions (Ringer, p. 93). According to this argument, we are able to explain the origin of the capitalism in the same way as we analyze a temperamental mother\u2019s motive to commit violence to her child (ibid, p. 178). Let us suppose a young mother, who is upset with child\u2019s misconduct, boxed her child\u2019s ear. Afterward, she makes an excuse based on \u201cempirical knowledge\u201d. This empirical knowledge means that she usually does not use violence toward her child and her irrational behavior would not have happened when she was not irritated by a quarrel with the cook. For that reason, she defends herself by asserting that the violence was an \u201caccidental\u201d and not an \u201cadequately\u201d caused one. Simply put, \u201cshe had made judgments of objectivity possibility and had operated with the category of adequate causation\u201d(ibid). Weber wrote:<\/p>\n

Reflective knowledge, even of one\u2019s own experience, is nowhere and never a literally \u201crepeated experience\u201d or a simple \u201cphotograph\u201d of what was experience; the \u201cexperience,\u201d when it is made into an \u201cobject\u201d, acquires perspectives and interrelationship which were not \u201cknown\u201d in the experience itself (ibid)<\/p>\n

This implies that causal laws are formulated by investigators not only by the researchers\u2019 subjective views but also by objective possibilities based on empirical knowledge. When investigators attempt to make ideal-types, they extrapolates their evaluative ideas in relation to empirical data (which is viewed as objective) and these ideal-types continue to be modified by empirical analysis. Ideal-types are not complete scientific theory but methodological means. Ideal-types are also changing depending on the dominating value concepts of a particular society and age. Therefore, for each period or society that we study, we have a correspondingly new notion of ideal-types.<\/p>\n

3. Conclusion<\/h2>\n

Max Weber\u2019s primary contribution to the social sciences is his suggestion of alternative methodology between naturalism and anti-naturalism. Within the extreme conflicts between the two, he points out the fallacy of both positions and attempts to develop his independent methodology. As for naturalism, he acknowledges that social phenomena can be scientifically investigated like the phenomena of nature. Importantly, however, Weber has a different view on objectivity from positivists. In the natural sciences, \u201cobjectivity\u201d can be achieved when investigators exclude their subjective values. In contrast, \u201cobjectivity\u201d in the social sciences can be accomplished through \u201cideal-types\u201d when the investigator\u2019s values are aligned with (insofar as possible) the cultural values of the society he or she studies.<\/p>\n

When it comes to anti-naturalism, he takes the historians\u2019 view that the aim of the social sciences is to study particular individualities based on interpretation. Unlike the historians, however, it is possible to find causal laws about specific social phenomenon and these are \u201cinevitable\u201d means to understand \u201cinfinite\u201d reality. These casual laws are discovered not by subjective intuition but \u201cobjective possibility\u201d based on empirical laws.<\/p>\n

Against the natural monism which understands reality under universal laws, Weber distinguishes \u201can empirical science of concrete reality\u201d. With value-orientation, social scientists choose \u201cworthy of being know\u201d and this enables us to uncover unique characteristics of reality. Weber argues that we need concepts to explain social phenomena. In this regard, through an \u201cideal-type\u201d, Weber believes that we can explain meaning and the causal relations of various human behaviors.<\/p>\n

Ideal-types are not universal laws, but heuristic means for understanding our culture and society. Since ideal-types reflect our cultural values, they differ in accordance with peculiar people, societies and times. In this sense, the ideal-types still have important meanings to modern society. More specifically and perhaps his most important contribution from Weber\u2019s methodology is able to bridge the gap between individual values and social sciences. This gives us insight into how to solve the problem of pluralism and conflicts over values.<\/p>\n

< Bibiliography ><\/p>\n

Aron, Raymond. (1968) Main Currents in Sociological Thought Richard Howard and Helen Weaver, trans. London: Basic Books Inc.<\/p>\n

Burger, Thomas. (1976) Max Weber\u2019s Theory of Concept formation: History, Laws, and Ideal Types Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press.<\/p>\n

Ekstrom, Mats. (1992) \u201cCasual Explanation of Social Action: The Contribution of Max Weber and of Critical Realism to a Generative View of Casual Explanation in Social Sciences\u201d Acta Sociologica 35(2): 107-122.<\/p>\n

Hekman, Susan J. (1983) Max Weber and Contemporary Social Theory Oxford: University of Norte Dame Press.<\/p>\n

Halfpenny, Peter. (2000) \u201cPositivism in the Twentieth Century\u201d in Rizter, G. and Smart, B.(eds) Handbook of Social Theory London: Sage<\/p>\n

Huff, Toby E. (1984) Max Weber and the Methodology of the Social Sciences New Brunswick: Transaction, Inc.<\/p>\n

Mises, L. (2003) Epistemological Problems of Economics Ludwig Von Mises Inst.<\/p>\n

Ringer, Fritz. (1997) Max Weber\u2019s Methodology: The Unification of the Cultural and Social Sciences Cambridge: Harvard University Press.<\/p>\n

Tenbruck, Friedrich H. (1959) \u201cDie Genese der Methodologies Max Webers,\u201d in : KZfSS 11: 573-690.<\/p>\n

_________. (1980) \u201cThe Problem of Thematic Unity in the Works of Max Weber\u201d The British Journal of Sociology 31(3): 316-351.<\/p>\n

Weber, Max. (1947) The Theory of Social and Economic Organization A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, trans. London: The Free Press.<\/p>\n

_________. (1949) The Methodology of the Social Sciences Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch, trans. New York: The Free Press<\/p>\n

_________. (1991) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills trans. London: Routlege.<\/p>\n

Winch, Peter. (1958) The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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